

THE AUGUSTINIAN THREEFOLD WORD AND ANGELIC MENTAL SPEECH

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Introduction

There are numerous places where medieval philosophers and theologians discuss language. One of these is in chapters and questions on the speech of angels. Theologians usually consider that angels can speak not only to men but also to each other. It is their treatment of this conversation between angels that is especially interesting, because of the way that is seen to be analogous with human conversation.

Angelic speech is by nature a *mental* language: it is intelligible, not sensible, since angels are incorporeal beings, pure intelligences. But do they really need to talk? Men need language because of their corporeal nature, since the body is a barrier that hides their thoughts within themselves, so that they need to use sensible signs to transfer their thoughts outside their minds to another being. Thirteenth-century thinkers, however, usually held that angels, as incorporeal beings, had minds that are transparent to each other. The main argument in favour of the possibility of such angelic speech is that, just as in the case of men, besides their need to be able to preserve the privacy of their consciences, they also should enjoy the freedom to express their thoughts when and to whichever angel they wish. Some theologians distinguish between an area of angelic mental life that is transparent and an area that is opaque, and so can be made known to others only through language. Thomas Aquinas, for instance, distinguishes between “contents”, the species which are the same in all angels and constitute their essence, and which are totally transparent to each other, and “acts of thought”, which depend on the will and which are not transparent. Others, like Peter of John Olivi¹ or John Duns Scotus, claim a complete transparency, but want speech to be ‘freely’ directed to the other. They claim that speech and its converse hearing occur when one’s thoughts are *liberaliter* addressed to the other, just as is an act of

¹ PETRUS IOANNIS OLIVI, *Quaestio de locutione angelorum* = *Lectura super librum De angelica hierarchia* c.7 qq.7-8, ed. S. PIRON, in *Oliviana* 1 (2003), <http://www.oliviana.org/>.

true love, accompanied with an opening of oneself and a movement towards a friend. One of the most interesting discussions bears on the criteria given to explain the distinction, admitted by all theologians up to William of Ockham, between angels' thought (*cogitatio*) and angels' speech (*locutio*). Is thought distinct from speech only because speech, not thought, is directed to someone (*ordinatum ad alterum*), as most thirteenth-century theologians admit? Or is there, as Giles of Rome would have it, another feature explaining their distinction? Does thought need, in order to be received by another being, a *medium*, a sign, which is distinct from it? And is the sign, as a bearer, different from the thought itself? On this last point is there a difference between the *medium* used by angels and the one used by men, or more precisely, is angels' speech compositional, discursive and inferential, and does it allow for the formation of propositions and syllogisms in the manner of human speech? All these questions receive interesting and contrasted answers.²

² I refer here to two studies in which I started investigating these issues, quoted below. Many important articles are devoted to angels' speech: J.-L. CHRÉTIEN, "Le langage des anges selon la scolastique", in *Critique* 35 (1979), 674-89, reprt. in *La voix nue. Phénoménologie de la promesse*, Paris 1990; B. FAES DE MOTTONI, "Enuntiatores divini silentii: Tommaso d'Aquino e il linguaggio degli angeli", in *Medioevo* 12 (1986), 197-228; EADEM, "Voci, 'alfabeto' et altri segni degli angeli nella Quaestio XII del *De cognitione angelorum* di Egidio Romano", in *Medioevo* 13 (1987), 71-104; EADEM, *San Bonaventura e la scala di Giacobbe. Letture di angelologia*, Napoli 1995; EADEM, "Il linguaggio e la memoria dell'angelo in Dante", in *Dante e la cultura del suo tempo. Dante e le culture dei confini*. Atti del Convegno Internazionale di Studi Danteschi, Gorizia 1997, 33-52. B. FAES DE MOTTONI et T. SUAREZ-NANI, "Hiérarchies, miracles et fonction cosmologique des anges au XIII^e siècle", in *Mélanges de l'Ecole française de Rome. Moyen Âge* 114 (2002), 717-52; H. GORIS, "The Angelic Doctor and Angelic Speech: The Development of Thomas Aquinas's Thought on How Angels Communicate", in *Medieval Philosophy and Theology* 11 (2003), 87-105; T. KOBUSH, "The Language of Angels: On the Subjectivity and Inter-subjectivity of Pure Spirits", in *Angels in Medieval Philosophical Inquiry: Their Function and Significance*, ed. I. IRIBARREN and M. LENZ (Ashgate Studies in Medieval Philosophy) Aldershot 2008, 131-42; M. LENZ, "Why Can't Angels Think Properly? Ockham against Chatton and Aquinas", in *Angels in Medieval Philosophical Inquiry*, ed. IRIBARREN and LENZ, 155-67; C. MARMO, "Lo statuto semiotico della comunicazione angelica nella teologia tra XIII e XIV secolo", in *Animali, angeli e macchine. 1. Come comunicano e come pensano*, a cura di G. MANETTI e A. PRATO, Pisa 2007, 133-53; C. PANACCIO, "Angel's Talk, Mental Language and the Transparency of the Mind", in *Vestigia, Images, Verba: Semiotics and Logic in Medieval Theological Texts (XIIth-XIIIth century)*, ed. C. MARMO, Turnhout 1997, 323-35; C. PANACCIO, *Le discours intérieur, de Platon à Guillaume d'Ockham*, Paris 1999; D. PERLER, "Thought Experiments: The Methodological Function of Angels in Late Medieval Epistemology", in *Angels in Medieval Philosophical Inquiry*, ed. IRIBARREN and LENZ, 143-53; B. ROLING, *Locutio angelica. Die Diskussion der Engelsprache als Antizipation einer Sprechaktttheorie in Mittelalter und*

I shall concentrate on the different ways in which the theologians apply Augustine's theory of *verbum* to explain angels' speech, to show how these thirteenth-century discussions, facing the necessity to distinguish between thought and language, are an important contribution to the elaboration of theories on mental language, which will flourish in the next century. The difficulties met by theologians are due to the *mental* nature of angelic speech and to its *communicative* dimension. Whereas in human speech the difference between the interior word and the uttered word is obvious because of their difference of nature, the problem becomes more complex with angels, and it will become a major issue to establish whether being directed to the other (*ordinatio ad alterum*) is sufficient to distinguish them. Moreover, this *ordinatio ad alterum*, which is one of the distinctive features of signs according to Augustine's *De doctrina christiana*, does not play an important role in his treatment of the *verbum* in *De Trinitate*, and hence in the chapters written by medieval theologians. The chapters on angels' speech have, however, brought together these two aspects of Augustine's thought on language, in Giles of Rome's words, the *representative* and the *communicative* functions.

I. *Locutio* and *Loqui*

Just a small remark to begin with. There are numerous words in Latin the meaning of which falls within the range of "language" (*locutio*, *sermo*, *loquela*, *lingua*, *idioma*, *vox*, etc.). The semantic distinctions among them are not always clear, nor do they correspond exactly to those in modern languages, which themselves differ from one another.³ It is important to

Früher Neuzeit, Leiden 2008; I. ROSIER-CATACH, "Le parler des anges et le notre", in *Ad Ingenii Acuitionem: Studies in Honour of Alfonso Maierù*, ed. S. CAROTI, R. IMBACH, Z. KALUZA, G. STABILE, and L. STURLESE, Louvain-la-Neuve 2007, 377-401; EADEM, "Solo all'uomo fu dato di parlare. Dante, gli angeli e gli animali", in *Rivista di filosofia neoscolastica* 98 (2007), 435-65; T. SUAREZ-NANI, *Connaissance et langage des anges*, Paris 2002; EADEM, *Les anges et la philosophie*, Paris 2002; EADEM, "Il parlare degli angeli: un segreto di Pulcinella?", in *Il segreto*, a cura di C. ARCELLI (Micrologus: Natura, Scienze e Società Medievali 14), Firenze 2006, 79-100; A. TABARRONI, "Il linguaggio degli angeli", in *Prometeo* 12 (1985), 88-93; J.R. VEENSTRA, "La communication avec les anges: les hiérarchies angéliques, la *lingua angelorum*, et l'élévation de l'homme dans la théologie et la magie: Bonaventure, Thomas d'Aquin, Eiximenis et l'Almandal", in *Mélanges de l'Ecole française de Rome. Moyen Âge*, 114 (2002), 773-812.

³ See I. ROSIER-CATACH, B. CASSIN, P. CAUSSAT et A. GRONDEUX, "langue", in *Vocabulaire européen des Philosophies, Dictionnaire des intraduisibles*, éd. B. CASSIN, Paris 2004; M. BARATIN, B. CASSIN, I. ROSIER-CATACH, F. ILDEFONSE, J. LALLOT et J. LÉON, "mot", in *Vocabulaire*; B. CASSIN, M. GALLAND, S. LAUGIER, A. DE LIBERA, F. NEF et I.

note that in the discussions on angels, the main question is about the way in which they “talk” or “speak” (*loqui*) to God, to each other, to themselves or to men, hence the noun *locutio*: I shall use in English the nouns “talk” or “speech” and the related verbs without semantic distinction. The question is not, then, about a faculty of language, or a “tongue” (*lingua*), in spite of the oft quoted maxim from 1 Cor. 13 “Si linguis hominum loquar et angelorum....” So the discussion of angelic speech should be carefully distinguished from other discussions about “language.” For instance, the question about angels is whether they are able *loqui*, but the question about animals is whether they are able *vocare*, this last verb being itself just as imprecise as is the substantive *vox* from which it is derived. The imprecision and multiplicity of the vocabulary come mostly from the variety of the sources, which convey different doctrines or points of views; those words were either those used by native Latin speakers in Antiquity, or those chosen (or granted new meanings) by non-native Latin speakers to translate philosophical or theological texts from different languages, at different times. A good example is Boethius’ use of the term *vox* (as distinct from *locutio* and *interpretatio*), which rests on a mixture of Aristotelian and Stoic doctrine.⁴

The chapters on angels’ speech often try to integrate discussions on language originating from an amazing variety of sources, biblical, philosophical and theological. Among arguments in favour of angels’ speech, the distinction between the infinite desires of men and of the finite desires of animals, from Avicenna, is mentioned by Albert the Great. Similarly, that based on the necessity to teach (not present in animals because their knowledge comes from instinct) is also taken from Avicenna by Giles of Rome,⁵ whereas Thomas Aquinas borrows from Aristotle’s *Politics* the importance of having a means to express what is just or unjust. In his commentary on Aristotle’s *Politics*, Thomas refers to *De anima*, to conclude: “we see that, whereas other animals have *voice*, only man has *locu-*

ROSIER-CATACH, “signe” in *Vocabulaire*.

⁴ Cf. the contradiction noted by AEGIDIUS ROMANUS, *De cognitione angelorum*, Venetiis: per Simonem de Luere 1503; rpt. Frankfurt 1968, f. 114ra: “Et inde est quod philosophus de significatione vocum videtur *sibi contradicere*. Nam in Perierm. distinguit quasdam voces esse significativas et quasdam non significativas. In secundo autem De anima diffinit vocem per esse quid significativum. Cum ergo quodlibet diffinitivum debeat universaliter predicari de diffinito—si esse significativum est diffinitivum vocis oportet quod conveniat omni voci.”

⁵ AVICENNA, *Liber de anima seu sextus de naturalibus* V pt.5 c.1, ed. S. VAN RIET (Avicenna Latinus), Louvain-Leiden 1968, 71-73.28-60.

tio” (“Videmus enim quod cum quaedam alia animalia habeant *vocem*, solus homo supra alia animalia habeat *loquutionem*”). Just as for Aristotle, the main argument for Thomas is the need to express moral judgements. Giles of Rome is very good at bringing together sources. He combines Aristotle and Avicenna to explain language not only in his influential *De regimine principum* but also in his long question on angelic communication; on the basis of the idea that *sermo* is necessary for humans in order for them to be *communicative and political animals*, Giles explains that what can be said of men should *multo magis* be said of angels.⁶

What is interesting, therefore, is to determine the criteria for *locutio* given by each author, to appreciate his arguments and analyses. For some, it is the thought as addressed to other beings, for others, that it should be addressed with a sign, for others that this sign be a *sensible* sign. When Dante claims, in *De Vulgari eloquentia*, that only man possesses *locutio*, that to him only was granted the property of *loqui*, as opposed to angels and inferior animals,⁷ he is talking about *locutio* in a very precise meaning: as a means to transmit one’s thought to others, as long as it is done through a “rational and sensible sign,” a tripartite means “infused” in Adam with his soul, composed of words signifying things, of constructions made from these words, and of the utterance of these constructions (“quantum ad rerum vocabula et quantum ad vocabulorum constructionem

⁶ AEGIDIUS ROMANUS, *De cognitione angelorum*, ed. Venetiis 1503, f. 112va-vb: “Unde et Philosophus in hac materia videtur sibi quodammodo contradicere. Nam in libro Politicorum videtur velle quod loqui sit quid naturale, unde ipse sic ait quod homini sermonem nam dedit, quod etsi philosophus hoc non diceret, ipsa tamen veritas ad hoc nos compellit. Nam quod consequitur totam speciem oportet quod sit quid naturale. Locutio autem consequitur totam humanam speciem. Ergo locutio in hominibus est quid naturale. Et multo magis in angelis. Immo ex quo homo est naturaliter animal communicativum, ut in arguendo dicebatur, et ex quo est animal naturaliter politicum, ut probatur in Politicis, quia ex hoc homo maxime est animal communicativum et politicum, quia potest per sermonem exprimere suos conceptus, oportet quod sermo sit homini naturalis, et multo magis locutio erit naturalis in angelis. Distinguemus ergo de naturali, quia potest esse aliquid naturaliter in generali, et in speciali. In generali quidem naturale est homini quod loquatur, unde et omnes homines loquuntur. Sed in speciali quod loquatur sic vel sic hoc est ab arte et ad placitum. Ideo non omnes homines eodem modo loquuntur. Inde est quod cum in Politicis dicatur quod sermo est datus homini a natura, in Periermeneias dicitur quod voces sunt ad placitum. Erit ergo sermo a natura et ad placitum, sed a natura est in generali, ad placitum in speciali. Sic et in angelis quod exprimant per aliqua signa et per aliquos nutus suas cogitationes et suas affectiones est in eis naturale. Sed quod exprimant per hec signa vel per hos nutus potest esse ad placitum.”

⁷ DANTE, *De vulgari eloquentia* I.ii.1, ed. P.V. MENGALDO, in *Opere minori Dante Alighieri* 2 (Letteratura italiana. Storia e testi 5), Milano-Napoli 1979.

et quantum ad constructionis prolationem"). Angels can communicate their thoughts but not through *locutio* in this sense.⁸

II. The Three Types of Verbs

The source that is most often used to describe angels' *locutio* is Augustine's *De Trinitate*, and in this way theological discussions about the threefold nature of the *verbum* appear in our discussions on angels' talk. As is well known, Augustine establishes a distinction between (1) the *verbum in corde* or *verbum cordis*, which "has neither sound nor any thought of a sound" and does not belong to any language ("nullius linguae"),⁹ the image as present in memory as far as it is actually thought; (2) the *verbum imaginabile* (often called *imaginatio vocis* or *verbum interiorius prolutum*), which is the mental image of the uttered word (just as, says Augustine, when we pray silently), and which thus belongs to one tongue; (3) the uttered *verbum*. Augustine explains that when we want another person to know our thought (*cogitatio*) or *verbum in corde*, we must exhibit a corporeal sign which signifies it, a sign that can be either a sound, when it is directed to the ears, or a gesture (*nutus*), when it is directed to the eyes. The word *locutio* is sometimes used by Augustine to designate this outer speech.¹⁰

⁸ See ROSIER-CATACH, "Solo all'uomo" (see n. 2 above).

⁹ AUGUSTINUS, *De Trinitate* XV.10.19, ed. W.J. MOUNTAIN auxiliante Fr. GLORIE, in CCSL 50a, Turnhout 1968, 485-86; IDEM, *De Trinitate* XV.14.24, 497.

¹⁰ IDEM, *De Trinitate* XV.10.19 (CCSL 50a), 485-86: "Quisquis igitur potest intelligere verbum, non solum antequam sonet, verum etiam antequam sonorum ejus imagines cogitatione volvantur, hoc enim est quod ad nullam pertinet linguam, earum scilicet quae linguae appellantur gentium, quarum nostra latina est.... Necesse est enim cum verum loquimur, id est, quod scimus loquimur, ex ipsa scientia quam memoria tenemus, nascatur verbum quod ejusmodi sit omnino, cujusmodi est illa scientia de qua nascitur. Formata quippe cogitatio ab ea re quam scimus, verbum est quod in corde dicimus, quod nec graecum est, nec latinum, nec linguae alicujus alterius. Sed cum id opus est in eorum quibus loquimur perferre notitiam, aliquod signum quo significetur assumitur. Et plerumque sonus, aliquando etiam nutus, ille auribus, ille oculis exhibetur, ut per signa corporalia etiam corporis sensibus verbum quod mente gerimus innotescat. Nam et innuere quid est, nisi quodam modo visibiliter dicere?... Sed haec atque hujusmodi signa corporalia sive auribus sive oculis praesentibus quibus loquimur exhibemus: inventae sunt autem litterae, per quas possemus et cum absentibus colloqui: sed ista signa sunt vocum, cum ipsae voces in sermone nostro earum quas cogitamus signa sunt rerum." IDEM, *De Trinitate* XV.11.20 (CCSL 50a), 488: "Pervenendum est ergo ad illud verbum hominis, ad verbum rationalis animantis, ad verbum non de deo natae sed a deo factae imaginis dei, (3) quod neque prolativum est in sono neque (2) cogitativum in similitudine soni quod alicuius linguae esse

The exterior word is sometimes called a sign of the interior word, as in the oft quoted passage: “The word that sounds outwardly is the sign of the word that gives light inwardly, and it is this latter that has the greater claim to be called ‘word’.”¹¹ But elsewhere Augustine distinguishes between the *verbum* and the *vox* which is the “vehicle” of the verb (*vehiculum verbi, sonus est vocis*).¹² As is well known, Anselm rethinks this distinction with the help of Boethius, and hence uses the word *locutio*, and it is through his development in the *Monologion* that it will circulate in the Middle Ages. For Augustine, and even more for Anselm, these three types of words are three modes of talking (*tres loquendi varietates*), since, as Anselm explains, one can talk about something either with sensible signs, or with these same signs but as thought interiorly in a non-sensible way, or without signs but only “saying them interiorly in our sole mind.”¹³ A third important source is John of Damascus’ *De fide orthodoxa*.¹⁴

	Augustine, <i>De Trinitate</i>	Anselm, <i>Monologion</i>
0	knowledge in memory (<i>scientia in memoria</i>)	
1	word in the heart, which does not belong to any tongue (<i>verbum cordis, verbum in corde, verbum quod mente gerimus, quod in corde dicimus, verbum nullius linguae—quod ad nullius gentis pertinet linguam</i>)	language of the soul or of reason (<i>locutio mentis sive rationis; res ipsae vel corporum imaginatione vel rationis intellectu pro rerum ipsarum diversitate intus in nostra mente dicendo = naturalia et apud omnes gentes eadem = “maxime proprium et principale rei verbum”</i>)
2	word uttered interiorly, which has the intellection of the sound (<i>verbum interius prolatum, quod habet cogitationem soni</i>)	insensible signs (<i>signa... intra nos insensibiliter cogitando</i>)
3	exterior word (<i>verbum exterius</i>) which can be either a visual sign (<i>nutus</i>) or an auditory sign (<i>signum</i>)	sensible signs (<i>signa sensibilia</i>)

necesse sit, (1) sed quod omnia quibus significatur signa praecedit et gignitur de scientia quae manet in animo quando eadem scientia intus dicitur sicuti est. Simillima est enim visio cogitationis visioni scientiae. Nam quando per sonum dicitur vel per aliquod corporale signum, non dicitur sicuti est sed sicut potest videri audiri per corpus. Quando ergo quod est in notitia hoc est in verbo, tunc est verum verbum et veritas qualis exspectatur ab homine ut quod est in ista, hoc sit et in illo; quod non est in ista, non sit et in illo.”

¹¹ IDEM, *De Trinitate*, XV.11.20 (CCSL 50a), 486: “...verbum quod foris sonat signum est verbi quod intus lucet cui magis verbi competit nomen.”

¹² AUGUSTINUS, *Sermo* 120 (PL 138), 677.16.

¹³ ANSELM, *Monologion*, ed. F.S. SCHMITT, in *S. Anselmi cantuariensis... Opera omnia* 1, Edinburgh 1946, 10.31-48.

¹⁴ IOANNES DAMASCENUS, *De fide orthodoxa: Versions of Burgundio and Cerbanus*, ed. E.M. BUYTAERT, St. Bonaventure, NY 1955; see C. PANACCIO, *Le discours* (see n. 2).

There are numerous difficulties as far as the application of this well-known threefold scheme to angels' speech is concerned. As Giles of Rome notes, none of these modes of talking can be used by angels: not the first one, because, if so, there would not be any difference between thought (*cogitatio*) and speech (*locutio*); nor the second one, since it is dependent on imagination, a sensitive power which angels do not possess; nor the third one, since it requires corporeal organs:

We should examine whether one angel speaks to another. And it seems that he does not, because speech is twofold, outward and inward. Inward speech, which is produced in the soul, is the same as thought, but outward speech is the same as vocal utterance. We could however distinguish a third type of speech which is the same as the formation of imagination, as Augustine in chap. XV.11 of *De Trinitate* distinguishes three kinds of word, the word formed in the soul, the imagined word, and the uttered word. Thus if one angel speaks to another, this is not through a word formed in his soul, because to form a word in this way is identical to thinking, and the thoughts of one angel would be known by others, which is not correct; nor is it through an imagined word, because angels have neither *phantasia* nor *imaginatio*, since these are bodily powers; but neither is it through a word uttered vocally, since an angel does not have a bodily tongue and bodily organs with which the word vocally uttered is formed, since he is incorporeal.¹⁵

Theologians, for obvious reasons, want to maintain that the process is threefold, but they use very different strategies. Claude Panaccio has shown that the main problem which theologians had to face in the thirteenth century, as far as the theory of the *verbum* is concerned, was to accommodate the doctrine of *De Trinitate* to the newly available *De anima*. The problem was to integrate Augustine's system with Aristotle's. For Augustine, the starting point was the *verbum in corde* as a product of an

¹⁵ AEGIDIUS ROMANUS, *In secundum librum Sententiarum* d.10 q.3 a.1, Venetiis 1581, rpt. Frankfurt a.M. 1968, vol.1, 480a C-D: "Uterius quaeritur, utrum unus Angelus loquatur alteri. Et videtur quod non, quia duplex est locutio, interior et exterior. Interior quidem locutio, quae fit in mente, est idem quod cogitatio, exterior autem est idem quod vocis prolatio. Posset autem distingui et tertia locutio quae esset idem quod imaginationis formatio, secundum quod Aug. 15 de Trin. c.11 videtur distinguere triplex verbum, videlicet verbum in mente formatum, verbum imaginatum, et in voce prolatum. Si ergo unus Angelus loquitur alii, non erit per verbum in mente formatum, quia sic formare verbum est idem quod cogitare, essent ergo cogitationes unius Angeli notae alteri, quod est inconveniens, nec hoc erit per verbum imaginatum quia Angeli phantasiam et imaginationem non habent, cum sint virtutes organicae, nec etiam hoc erit per verbum in voce prolatum, quia Angelus linguam corporalem et organa corporalia, quibus formatur verbum in voce prolatum non habet, cum sit incorporeus."

operation of the mind on the images stored in imagination, whereas for philosophers the starting point was the *species intelligibilis* present in the possible intellect through the action of the agent intellect. In discussions about angels' talk in the thirteenth century, the first level is always the active, voluntary consideration by the angel on something stored in his memory, usually called the *species intelligibilis*.

These strategies result from a specific requirement: to explain not only the formation of a word but also angelic *communication*. Theologians must pay particular attention to the communicative aspect of language. In Roger Bacon's terms, they must pay attention not only to the relation "in the accusative case" of the sign to what is signified, but much more to the relation "in the dative case" of the sign to the other to whom it is addressed.¹⁶ Moreover, while still using the framework of the *De Trinitate*, they must borrow material from *De doctrina christiana* or other Augustinian texts where this intersubjective conception of the sign (one absent from the chapters written by medieval theologians about *verbum* in general) is discussed. For this reason, the analysis of the *verbum* in general developed by one author will not always agree with what he has to say about angelic *verbum*. The adaptation of these different aspects of Augustine's discussion about language and sign are interesting, since they contribute to a greater attention paid to the linguistic dimension of the *verbum*, as is clearly seen in the discussions about the "discursive" nature of angels' talk, about its natural or conventional nature, the possibility of equivocity, errors, lies and so on.¹⁷ We shall offer a few examples to show the different strategies for accommodating the Augustinian model and the different ways in which theologians distinguish or assimilate thought and language, concept and sign.

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III. The *Summa Halensis*

One of the first detailed discussions of angels' talk is found in the *Summa Halensis*. The starting point is the *species intelligibilis*, which can first be known in a conceptual mode, in the intellect, then as an affect, and thirdly

¹⁶ K.M. FREDBORG, L.O. NIELSEN and J. PINBORG, "An Unedited Part of Roger Bacon's *Opus Majus: De Signis*", in *Traditio* 34 (1978), 76-136; cf. I. ROSIER-CATACH, *La parole comme acte. Sur la grammaire et la sémantique au XIII^e siècle*, Paris 1994, 321-22; EADEM., *La parole efficace*, Paris 2004, 69 sqq.

¹⁷ See I. ROSIER-CATACH, "Le parler des anges" (see n. 2 above).

as moving the angel so that it is manifested to someone else. He calls this *species a verbum*, when the angel wants to manifest it—this corresponds to the *verbum interior* for humans—and a *nutus*, when it is actually manifested—this corresponds to the *verbum exterior*:

Nutus properly speaking refers properly to the sensible faculty.... Thus, since in angels there is no sensible faculty, there is not properly a *nutus*. We grant however that here there is a spiritual *nutus*.... When we say that an angel talks, there is (1) first, the intelligible species in his intellect, as long as he knows it; (2) secondly, <the intelligible species> in its affect, as long as he is affected by it; (3) thirdly, that same species, that is the species which is thought and by which he is affected, moves or inclines this angel so that he manifests it to another angel. From this it follows that the angel has the will to manifest it, and that very species, as it is under this will to manifest it, is called a ‘word’. Thus it is first considered as a concept, secondly, as an affect, thirdly, as a word.... This species, as it exists with a will to manifest it, is called *word*, as it exists as manifested in act, is called *nutus*, to the extent that we think that the word has some similitude with our outward word or voice, since, just as our voice is the vehicle of the inward word to someone else, the *nutus*, so to speak, transports the word outside to another....¹⁸

	<i>Summa Halensis</i>	
1	Intelligible species in its intellect, as it is known by the angel (<i>Species intelligibilis in eius intellectu, secundum quod eam cognoscit</i>)	Concept
2	In its affect, when the angel is affected by it (<i>secundo, in eius affectu, secundum quod circa eam afficitur</i>)	Affect

¹⁸ *Summa Halensis* inq.2 tr.3 sect.2 q.1 tit.3 c.6 §149 sol., ed. PP. Collegii S. Bonaventurae, in *Doctoris Irrefragabilis ALEXANDRI DE HALES... Summa theologica* 2, Firenze 1928, 198a: “*Nutus* si proprie accipiatur refertur proprie ad *vim sensibilem*.... Unde cum in angelis non sit vis sensibilis, nec proprie est ibi *nutus*. Concedimus tamen quod ibi est *nutus spiritualis*.... In angelo, QUEM LOQUI DICIMUS, (1) primo est species intelligibilis in eius intellectu, secundum quod eam cognoscit; (2) secundo, in eius affectu, secundum quod circa eam afficitur; (3) tertio, eadem species, scilicet illud quod sic conceptum est et circa quod sic afficitur, movet vel inclinat ipsum angelum ad hoc ut eam alii *manifestet*. Unde tunc angelus habet *manifestandi eam voluntatem, et ipsa species, prout sic est sub voluntate manifestandi, dicitur verbum*. Unde primo est in ratione conceptus, secundo in ratione affectus, tertio in ratione verbi.... Ista species, prout est sub voluntate manifestandi, dicitur *verbum*, prout est in actu manifestandi, dicitur *nutus*, ut intelligamus ibi verbum habere similitudinem nostri *verbi interioris*, *nutus* autem similitudinem nostri *verbi exterioris sive vocis*, quia sicut vox nostra est vehiculum verbi interioris ad alium, ita ibi *nutus* quasi vehit ad alium suo modo ipsum verbum exterius....”

3	That same species... as it moves the angel to manifest it to others (<i>tertio, eadem species,... movet vel inclinat ipsum angelum ad hoc ut eam alii manifestet</i>)	Associated with the will to manifest it to others (<i>sub voluntate manifestandi</i>)	Word (<i>verbum</i>) = inner word
		As actually manifested to others (<i>in actu manifestandi</i>)	<i>Nutus</i> = <u>outer word or voice</u>

The author of the *Summa* tries to follow as much as possible the parallel between angels' speech and men's speech. In both cases there is an interior species which requires a "vehicle" in order for it to be exteriorised, the difference being that for angels it is addressed to vision, for men to hearing. Thus the relation of the *nutus spiritualis* to spiritual vision is the same as the relation of the *vox* to audition. Level 3 combines the voluntary manifestation to others with the actual expression of this manifestation, two items which will be separated in later texts.

The theologian then faces the question of whether angels' speech requires a *medium*, offering at first a positive answer in view of the parallelism between angels' and men's speech.¹⁹ But the answer must be a negative one: the angel does not require a *medium*, since the word, insofar as it is directed to another angel, *is* the sign. The angelic sign is not an intermediary used by the angel to transmit his thoughts; it *is* this thought itself, insofar as it is directed towards another angel. Whereas with men *verbum* and sign are "essentially different," there is in the case of angels only a "difference of reason":

With this solution, we can answer the objections. The four objections which were first raised about these *nutus*, proceed as if *word* and *nutus* were essentially different, just as it is for us, but this is not the case. Note that for us there is a difference between voice and *nutus*, since voice is the vehicle of our inward word to someone's audition; *nutus* is the vehicle of our inward word to someone's sight; they agree in that both are the vehicle of the word.²⁰

¹⁹ *Summa Halensis* II inq.2 tr.3 sect.2 q.1 tit.3 c.6 §149 sol., ed. PP. Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 197a: "Consequenter quaeritur an locutio angeli fiat per medium. Sic enim est quod locutio hominis fit per medium, scilicet per aliquod signum: vel per signum audibile, ut per vocem, vel per signum visibile, ut per nutum, secundum illud 'Nutu signisque loquuntur'. Quaeritur ergo utrum in locutione angelica requiratur aliquod medium, ut aliquis nutus spiritualis."

²⁰ *Summa Halensis* II inq.2 tr.3 sect.2 q.1 tit.3 c.6 §149 sol., ed. PP. Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 198b: "Per hoc patet solutio ad obiecta. Quatuor enim obiectiones, quae fiebant primo de illis nutibus, procedunt ac si esset ibi aliud in essentia *verbum* et *nutus*, sicut in nobis est: non sic autem est. Iuxta hoc nota quod in nobis differt vox et nutus, quia vox est vehiculum verbi nostri interioris ad auditum alterius, nutus vero est vehiculum

Nutus has a special meaning here: whereas for men, *nutus* is the “gesture” or “nod” opposed to *signum* which is the “vocal sound”, in angels *nutus* is not a sensible sign and depends on a spiritual vision. This idea of a “difference of reason” between the interior *verbum* and the *verbum* as directed to others is an important and influential one, which we will find in other theologians but which will be heavily criticized by Giles of Rome.

IV. Albert the Great

Albert the Great analyzes angels’ speech in various works and in different ways, by trying always to parallel the *auctoritates*, just as he proceeds in his chapters on the *verbum* in general.²¹ The first level is thinking in act (*intelligere in actu*), when the innate species is first thought in itself as a *species*; the second level is the will to communicate this intellection to another angel (which in the *Summa de creaturis* he calls the “*conversio ad alterum*”); the third level combines the two processes. The first process is that of directing the *species* towards the extramental object (*innuitio ad rem*): since the species of the first level are innate and abstracted, they must be ordered towards the object to produce real knowledge of it; the second process requires the choice of an expressive mode that is suitable for angelic communication. In some passages, only the *directio ad rem* is mentioned. What is then described for the *locutio* has its mirror image in the *auditio*, which similarly requires the hearer to turn his consideration to the species, to *will* to receive the concept, and to direct his attention “towards the similitude of the same object.”²² Although there are some variations in the three texts in which he addresses the question, Albert connects *nutus* to the third level,²³ since it is, according to the authority of Basil,²⁴

verbi interioris ad visum; conveniunt autem in hoc quod utrumque est vehiculum verbi.”

²¹ See C. PANACCIO, *Le discours*, 164 sq.

²² ALBERTUS MAGNUS, *In I Sententiarum* d.10 a.16 sol., ed. A. BORGNET, in *B. Alberti Magni... Opera omnia* 25, Paris 1893, 296: “Ad hoc autem quod loqui eorum non videatur esse nisi intelligere secundum actum, dicendum quod ad loqui concurrunt tria, scilicet intelligere secundum actum, et conversio ad alterum sub voluntate innotescendi, et intentio dirigens similitudines ad res de quibus est sermo. Similiter ad auditum ista concurrunt, scilicet conversio ad loquentem, et voluntas accipiendi conceptum, et directio similitudinis ad rem eandem.”

²³ This “intentional” moment is present in IOANNES DAMASCENUS, *De fide* II.22, as *en-noia*, but occurs much earlier than at the level of the *verbum* or *logos*. Cf. PANACCIO, *Le discours*, 81-90.

²⁴ ALBERTUS MAGNUS, *Summa theologiae* II tr.9 q.35 memb.2, ed. A. BORGNET, in *Opera omnia* 32, Paris 1895, 379: “si intacta et nuda anima viveremus, ex ipsis tantum mentis

the movement of the mind towards the thing, the *nutus* being thus what helps to signify the thing, and not the mere *species rei* that corresponds to the first level.²⁵

Albert	<i>Summa de creaturis, In I Sent.</i> (ca. 1246)	<i>Summa theologiae</i> (1270)
0	forma a creatione datam, species	
1	turning (the attention) to the form given by creation (<i>conversio luminis super formam a creatione datam</i> [Summa de creaturis, ed. cit., 636])	intellect in act (<i>intellectus in actu</i> [sol., ed. cit., 636])
		turning (the attention) to the species of the thing about which the angel wants to talk about (<i>conversio super speciem rei de qua vult loqui intelligere secundum actum</i> ; ed. cit., 380)
2	disposition to make it known to another (<i>dispositio illius ad innotescendum alteri</i>)	word (<i>verbum</i>) or discourse (sermo) which is without utterance (<i>qui est sine voce</i> ; sol., ed. cit., 636)— <i>signum</i> (ad 2, ad 5, ed. cit., 637)—inwardly uttered discourse (<i>interius prolatus sermo</i> (ad 2, ad 4, ad 5, ed. cit., 637) = John of Damascus <i>sermo interior</i> (ad 8, ed. cit., 637) Basil's <i>intentio cogitationum</i> (ad 7, ed. cit., 637)
		Will to manifest one's concept to another angel (<i>Voluntas manifestandi alteri angelo conceptum suum</i>)
		<i>intentio cogitationum</i>

motibus et intentionibus cogitationum alterutrum nosceremur.”

²⁵ ALBERTUS MAGNUS, *Summa de creaturis* IV q.60 a.2 ad 7, ed. A. BORGNET, in *Opera omnia* 34, Paris 1895, 637: “Ad 1. Nutus ibi dicitur innuitio ad rem cum conversione voluntatis et notescendi ad alium angelum. Et licet ille nutus demonstret rem, tamen quia haec demonstratio est sub forma intelligibili, et est signum conceptus intelligentiae angelicae dicitur locutio.... Ad 7. Ad aliud dicendum, quod per motus mentis intelligit Basilus nutus per quod innuitur ad rem significandam, et non tantum intellectum secundum actum. Per intentionem autem cogitationum intelligit signa: quia per illa tenditur ad rem significandam et ad exprimendum conceptum cordis.”

3	turning to another angel through the address of one's discourse so that it is known to him (<i>conversio ad alterum angelum ordinans hunc sermonem ut alteri innotescat</i> [ed. cit., 636]) turning the will to the thing the discourse is about (<i>conversio voluntatis ad rem de qua est sermo</i>; sol., ad 4, ed. cit., 637 ; <i>innuitio ad rem</i> [ad 1, ed. cit., 636] – <i>intentio dirigens similitudines ad res de quibus est sermo</i> [<i>In I Sent.</i>, ed. cit., 297])	completes the discourse <i>nutus</i> (ad 1, ad 4, ed. cit., 637) = <i>locutio</i> (ad 1, ed. cit., 637) = Basilus' <i>motus mentis</i>	indication by the light of intelligence of the thing which he wants to manifest (<i>innuitio per lumen intelligentiae ad rem quam vult manifestare</i>)	<i>Nutus</i>
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In the early texts, because the distinctive feature of the second level is the *ordinatio ad alterum*, Albert places the *signum* here, according to the definition in *De doctrina christiana*. He equates it with Augustine's *interius prolatus sermo* (*Summae de creaturis* ad 2, ad 4, ad 5, 687), John of Damascus' *sermo interior* (*Ibid* ad 8), but also with the *intentio cogitationum* of Basil. Thus the *signum* is the similitude of the thing, a similitude that exists in the angel as an innate species, given by creation, and not abstracted from the thing, insofar as it is addressed to someone (*In II Sent.* a.13, 294). But in the later *Summa theologiae*, the species as merely thought is called *signum* (level 1), whereas its being addressed to others is connected to the *intentio cogitationum* (level 2), and its being related to the thing to the *nutus* (level 3).²⁶

²⁶ ALBERTUS MAGNUS, *Summa theologiae* II tr.9 q.34, ed. BORGNET, 380: "sol.: quod ad locutionem tria exiguntur (1) conversio scilicet luminis intelligentiae angelicae super speciem rei de qua vult loqui: et haec species vocatur *signum* per quod loquitur Angelus. (2) Secundum est voluntas manifestandi alteri Angelo conceptum suum: et hoc a Basilio vocatur *intentio cogitationum*, in hunc enim finem tendit Angelus locuendo, et dicit Augustinus, quod intentio est voluntas cum fine. (3) Exigitur etiam tertio innuitio per lumen intelligentiae ad rem quam vult manifestare: et haec vocatur *nutus*. Dicit autem Augustinus

The special meaning of *nutus*, already noticed, is also apparent here. Although in some twelfth-century theological texts it seems to be connected to a voluntary movement,²⁷ and in its usual meaning it has the sense of a visual sign, it retains a sense of “indication” of something. But it has a further sense here too: that of establishing a connection between the species that is thought and meant to be transmitted, and the object that is the purpose of the message. So the meaning of the word *nutus* is different when applied to corporeal beings, where its distinctive feature is its being visual, from when it is used about incorporeal things, where its distinctive feature is to be indicative of the thing:

In the case of sensible things *nutus* is used for a visual indication, but *nutus* in the sense of an indication and direction of the light of the intelligence towards the thing, the species of which is conceived in the intellect, is used for spiritual and immaterial speech.²⁸

Finally, for Albert, the concept or verb and the sign differ only *secundum rationem*, by the fact that the second is a concept as addressed to others, but no form is added to the species which is conceived to transform it into a sign:

....for angels, nothing is needed for being a sign in addition to the form or species which the angel uses in order to think, except for the fact that it is uttered to someone else.²⁹

And so, just as the author of the *Summa Halensis*, Albert concludes that angels have no need of a *medium* to act as the “vehicle” of the word: the thoughts of one angel are transmitted to another just as a reflection in one

in libro *De trinitate* quod formata cogitatio de ea re quam scimus, verbum est, quod interius in intellectu dispositum est, antequam vel dispositionem accipiat aliquam vocis vel imaginem. Unde dicit de illo, quod nec Graecum, nec Latinum est, nec alicujus linguae habet sonum. Et de eodem loquens Damascenus, in libro II *De fide orthodoxa* sic dicit: “Rursus dividit rationalis anima interius dispositum sermonem et prolatus. Est autem interius dispositus sermo, motus in excogitando fines sine aliqua enuntiatione. Unde multoties silentes sermonem totum apud nosmetipsos transimus, et in somnis disputamus. Prolatus vero sermo et in in syllabis et in voce operationem habet.”

²⁷ See T. KOBUSH, “The Language of Angels” (see n. 2 above).

²⁸ ALBERTUS MAGNUS, *Summa theologiae* II tr.9 q.34, ed. BORGNET, 381: “Nutus in sensibilibus deservit demonstrationi visus, sed nutus qui est innuitio et directio luminis intelligentiae ad rem cujus species concepta est in intellectu, deservit locutioni spirituali et immaterial.”

²⁹ ALBERTUS MAGNUS, *Summa de creaturis* IV q.60 a.2 ad 5, ed. BORGNET, 637: “Ad aliud dicendum, quod signum est in Angelo: signum enim non addit supra formam sive speciem sub qua intelligit Angelus, nisi rationem prolotionis ad alterum. Et est ipso sicut habitus conjunctivus actui interpretativo.”

mirror is transmitted by light into a mirror placed directly opposite it.³⁰

V. Bonaventure

Bonaventure, who follows *De Trinitate*³¹ closely in his questions on the word in general, and makes a threefold division into sensible word, what he calls a “medium word” (or *in cogitatione vocis*) and intelligible word, does not try to adapt this division to angels’ speech. The main purpose of his long discussion is to distinguish between thinking and talking. “Talking” (*loqui*) can be said in two ways, either of inward talking, which is properly understood as thinking (*cogitare*) and forming a word, or outward talking, when the thought is addressed to someone, which is properly described as talking (*loqui*). It then requires something more than mere thinking, which varies according to the nature of the addressee: God, an angel or man:

“To speak” (*loqui*) has two meanings: first, “to speak” describes an act that is inward or intrinsic; secondly, <it describes> an act towards someone else or in some way extrinsic. In the first case “to speak” is the same as forming or generating a word; in the second case it is the same as speaking or expressing a word already formed. In the first case speech either in God or in men or in angels is nothing other than thought. In the second case there is more in it than in thought, but the difference varies in the various cases.... To the objection that to speak (*loqui*) is the same as to say (*dicere*), the answer is that “to speak” has two meanings, in oneself and to others, and it is the same with “to say”; and although to say in oneself is the same as to think, or to conceive in thinking, yet to say something to someone else implies a further act.³²

³⁰ ALBERTUS MAGNUS, *Summa theologiae* II tr.9 q.35 memb.3 ad 1, ed. BORGNET, 382: “Ad primum obiectum dicendum, quod verbum a dicente Angelo *non procedit in audientem per aliquem spiritum medium qui sit verbi vehiculum sicut est in locutione hominis*: sed ab uno formatur in altero, quando per intentionem communicandi sibi suos conceptus dirigunt ad invicem. Sicut quod est in uno speculo formatur in altero directe sibi opposito per processum luminis de uno in alterum per reflexionem. Et hae dicuntur interpretativae potestates et auditivae in angelis secundum anagogicas significationes.”

³¹ BONAVENTURA, *In I Sententiarum* d.27 pars 2 q.4, ed. PP. Collegii S. Bonaventurae, in *Doctoris Seraphici S. Bonaventurae... Opera omnia* 1, Firenze 1882, 489: “Primum quidem est similitudo verbi creati ad increatum, ad quam insinuandam distinguit beatus Augustinus in libro decimo quinto *De trinitate* verbum secundum triplicem differentiam. Nam unum est verbum sensibile, aliud est verum intelligibile, tertium est verbum medium. Verum sensibile attenditur in prolatione vocis, verbum intelligibile in cogitatione rei, verbum medium in cogitatione vocis. — Et est ordo, quia primo cogitat aliquid homo quid sit, secundo, qualiter debeat cogitatum pronuntiare, tertio pronuntiat.”

³² BONAVENTURA, *In II Sent.* d.10 a.3 q.1 concl., in *Opera omnia* 2, Firenze 1882, 268-

	<i>In II Sententiarum</i>			
1/2	to talk inwardly (<i>loqui, dicere in se, sive intrinsecum</i>)	to form a word (<i>verbum formare</i>)	= thought (<i>cogitatio</i>)	
3	to talk to someone else (<i>loqui ad alterum, sive extrinsecum</i>)	to express (<i>exprimere</i>)	God	effect produced in itself : revelation to others
			Man	effect produced through the act of turning towards an other man, and the use of a sign which is a medium
			Angel	effect produced through the act of turning towards another (without a sign)

Bonaventure insists on the difference between angels' speech and men's. The difference rests, again, on the presence or absence of an intermediary to convey the thought (a *deferens medium*). For angels, although there are two distinct voluntary acts, of turning to the species and of addressing others, nothing else is further needed: "Just as the species was the interior word when the intellect was contemplating it for itself and in itself, in the same way when it addresses it to another angel, it becomes as it were a *nutus* and an exterior word."³³ For this reason, as clearly

69: "Loqui dupliciter est: uno modo loqui dicit actum in se sive intrinsecum; alio modo actum ad alterum sive quodam modo extrinsecum. Primo modo loqui idem est quod verbum formare sive gignere; secundo modo idem est quod verbum formatum depromere sive exprimere. Primo modo locutio sive in Deo, sive in homine, sive in Angelo non est aliud quam cogitatio. Secundo modo plus dicit quam cogitationem, sed differenter in diversis.... Ad aliud quod obiit, quod nihil aliud est loqui quam dicere, dicendum, quod sicut loqui est dupliciter, in se et ad alterum, sic etiam et dicere; et quamvis dicere in se idem sit quod cogitare vel cogitando intelligere, tamen dicere ad alterum ulteriorem habet actum."

³³ BONAVENTURA, *In II Sent.* d.10 a.3 q.1 concl., in *Opera omnia* 2, 269: "In homine.... ad hoc, quod anima conceptum suum alteri exprimat, oportet, quod ipsum voci sensibili per organa formatae, mediante vi imaginaria, coniungat, et sic similitudo intelligibilis sive signatum intelligibile per illud suum signum sensibile, mediantibus virtutibus sensitivis, ad intellectum alterius animae ascendat.... In spiritualibus autem substantiis... locutio supra cogitationem addit effectum sive respectum, sed non addit sensibile signum.... Necessarius est etiam actus novus quia non eadem conversione se supra se convertit et supra alterum vel ad alterum. — Sed tamen non est necessarium sensibile signum nec deferens medium, quia, cum ipse intellectus angelicus sine potentiis sensitivis natus sit suscipere, Angelus loquens sine sensibili medio natus est similiter offerre; et ideo ad loquendum sufficit ipsi Angelo ipsa species intelligibilis, quae ex virtute intellectiva ipsius Angeli ad imperium voluntatis potest ad alterum protendi. Et sicut illa species, dum eam sibi et in se contuebatur intellectus, erat verbum interius; sic dum eam protendit ad alterum, efficitur quasi

stated in the question, the expression of the word is a process which has three levels in men but only two in angels, since the last two are fused into one:

For, just as we learn through our senses, so that the species reaches the intellect through the interior senses, in the same way we express ourselves because the word of our internal thought is united to a word as it is thought, and afterwards to the sensible word as it is uttered, and from this an expression results in reality. But an angel does with one power what we do with many. And so the angel, in the same way as he knows a thing by applying an innate species to the thing that is knowable, so by directing an innate species to another angel who is cognizing, he reveals what he has in his mind to him; the other receives in a similar way, as they both turn their attention to the species, and so one speaks and the other listens.³⁴

VI. Thomas Aquinas

Thomas Aquinas proposes various analyses of angelic speech, always using the parallel with human speech.³⁵ But these analyses do not match what is said in the chapters on the word in general,³⁶ and which can be summarized as follows:

nutus et verbum exterius.... Sed actus considerandi eam in se, qui quidem est cogitatio et actus protendi ad alterum, qui est locutio actus est alius et alius...."

³⁴ BONAVENTURA, *In I Sent.* d.9 a.unica dub.4 resp., ed. PP. Collegii S. Bonaventurae, in *Opera omnia* 1, 189: "Sicut enim nos per sensum addiscimus, ita quod species per interiorum sensum pervenit ad intellectum, sic exprimimus; quia verbum cogitationis internae unitur voci in excogitatione et postmodum voci sensibili in pronuntiatione, et ex hoc fit expressio in actu. Angelus autem unica virtute facit quod nos pluribus. Unde angelus, sicut per applicationem speciei innatae ad ipsum cognoscibile ipsum cognoscit, sic ordinando speciem innatam ad alium angelum cognoscentem conceptus suos aperit; similiter alius mutua conversione recipit, et sic unus loquitur, alter audit."

³⁵ Cf. FAES DE MOTTONI, "Enuntiatores divini silentii"; GORIS, "The Angelic Doctor and Angelic Speech"; SUAREZ-NANI, *Connaissance et langage des anges* (see n. 2 above for references). The main texts are the following: the *Reportatio* on 1 Cor. 13:1 lect.1 (see GORIS, "The Angelic Doctor and Angelic Speech", 89 for the different versions, and 104 for a discussion about its date); THOMAS DE AQUINO, *In II Sententiarum* d.11 q.2 aa.2-3, ed. P. MANDONNET, in *Scriptum super libros sententiarum magistri Petri Lombardi* 2, Paris 1929, 283-87 (written ca. 1252-1256); THOMAS DE AQUINO, *De veritate* q.9, ed. A. DONDAINE, in *Sancti Thomae de Aquino Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII P.M. edita* 22.2, Roma 1975 (written ca. 1256-1259); *Summa theologiae* Ia qq.106-7 (written ca. 1267-1268).

³⁶ Cf. H. PAISSAC, *Théologie du Verbe : Saint Augustin et Saint Thomas*, Paris 1951; C. PANACCIO, "From Mental Word to Mental Language", in *Philosophical Topics* 20 (1992), 125-47, and IDEM, *Le discours* (see n. 2 above).

	<i>In I Sententiarum</i> d.27 a.1 resp., and	<i>De veritate</i> q.4 a.1
0	simple intuition in knowledge of what is intelligible (<i>simplex intuitus in cognitione intelligibilis</i>)	
1	The word of the heart (<i>verbum cordis</i>) = immediate similitude of the thing (or John of Damascus: <i>naturalis intellectus motus</i> = Augustine: <i>verbum animae impressum</i>)	in the intellective part of the soul alone
2	interior word which has the image of the utterance (<i>verbum interius quod habet imaginem vocis, verbum speciei vocis, exemplar exterioris verbi</i> = John of Damascus: <i>verbum in corde enuntiatum</i> = Augustine: <i>verbum animi sinu cogitatum</i>)	in imagination
3	vocal word (<i>verbum vocis, verbum exterius expressum</i> = John of Damascus: <i>nuntius intelligentiae</i> = Augustine: <i>verbum cum syllogismis pronuntiatum</i>)	in a bodily action by the movement of the tongue and other bodily instruments

In these early texts, although the intelligible species is not yet distinguished from the *verbum cordis*, the second level is always distinct from the first one, because it has a *linguistic* structure, being the image or the exemplar of the exterior vocal word.³⁷ But the parallel between men and angels, which can be read in the same commentary on the *Sentences*, shows a quite different system: the *verbum cordis*, which was the forma-

³⁷ THOMAS DE AQUINO, *De veritate* q.4 a.1 sol., ed. A. DONDAINE, in *Opera omnia* 22.1, Roma 1975, 120.192-223: "Et ideo, sicut in artifice tria consideramus, scilicet finem artificii, et exemplar ipsius, et ipsum artificium iam productum, ita et in loquente triplex verbum invenitur: scilicet (1) id quod per intellectum concipitur, ad quod significandum verbum exterius profertur: et hoc est *verbum cordis* sine voce prolatum; (2) item exemplar exterioris verbi, et hoc dicitur *verbum interius quod habet imaginem vocis*; (3) et verbum exterius expressum, quod dicitur *verbum vocis*. Et sicut in artifice praecedit intentio finis, et deinde sequitur excogitatio formae artificii, et ultimo artificiatum in esse producitur; ita (1) *verbum cordis* in loquente est (2) prius verbo quod habet imaginem vocis, et (3) postremum est *verbum vocis*. (3) Verbum igitur vocis, quia corporaliter expletur, de Deo non potest dici nisi metaphorice: prout scilicet ipsae, creaturae, a Deo productae verbum eius dicuntur, aut motus ipsarum, in quantum designant intellectum divinum, sicut effectus causam. (2) Unde, eadem ratione, nec verbum quod habet imaginem vocis, poterit dici de Deo proprie, sed metaphorice tantum; ut sic dicantur verbum Dei ideae rerum faciendarum. (1) Sed *verbum cordis*, quod nihil est aliud quam id quod actu consideratur per intellectum, proprie de Deo dicitur, quia est omnino remotum a materialitate et corporeitate et omni defectu; et huiusmodi proprie dicuntur de Deo, sicut scientia et scitum, intelligere et intellectum."

tion of a mental word, now is characterized by the fact that it is addressed to someone, by its *ordinatio ad alterum*. As for the third level, it is described as a choice of a suitable form to convey the word exteriorly:

	<i>In II Sententiarum</i> d.1 a.2 q.3	
	Men	Angels
1	Species thought inwardly (<i>species ergo conceptae interius, secundum quod manent in simplici conceptione intellectus, habent rationem intelligibilis tantum</i>)	Interior concept of the soul, which cannot be seen by others (<i>Similiter in angelis interior conceptus mentis libero arbitrio subjacens ab alio videri non potest</i>)
1/2	Species as addressed to another angel = word of the heart (<i>secundum autem quod ordinantur ab intelligente ut manifestandae alteri, habent rationem verbi, quod dicitur verbum cordis</i>)	Species thought as ordered to be manifested to another angel. It is called word of the heart (<i>Quando ergo speciem conceptam ordinat ut manifestandam alteri, dicitur verbum cordis</i>)
3	Species as put into exterior signs, either for sight (<i>nutus</i>) or for audition (<i>locutio vocalis</i>) (<i>secundum autem quod aptantur et quodammodo ordinantur signis exterius apparentibus, si quidem sunt signa ad visum, dicuntur nutus; si vero ad auditum, dicitur proprie locutio vocalis</i>)	Expressive sign of the interior concept, produced by the coordination of the species to something which can be seen naturally by another angel = speech expressed with intellectual signs (<i>Quando vero coordinat eam alicui eorum quae unus angelus in alio naturaliter videre potest, illud naturaliter cognoscibile fit signum expressivum interioris conceptus; et talis expressio vocatur locutio, non quidem vocalis, sed intellectualibus signis expressa; et virtus exprimendi dicitur lingua eorum</i>)

The specific difficulty Thomas faces when describing angels' speech is again to find a criterion to distinguish mere thought (*cogitatio*) from speech (*locutio*). Because the angels' word does not belong to any language, and because there cannot be a word that is the image of the sound (*verbum imaginabile vocis*), there cannot be a distinction between level 1 and 2, nor a level 2 as such. As a result, the *verbum cordis*, which in the chapters on *verbum* in general (see the first chart of this paragraph) was the word formed by turning to species in the memory, acquires the *new* feature of being meant to be addressed to someone (*ordinatio ad alterum*). The third level maintains a parallel between angels and men, through the requirement of a convenient means to convey the thought outwardly, which produces *intellectual speech* in angels and *vocal speech* in men. Thus *locutio* combines the *ordinatio ad alterum* of the second level with the convenient expression that results in a sign at the third level.

In some later writings, however, Thomas tries to combine Aristotle's *De anima* with Augustine's *De Trinitate*, distinguishing between the intelligible form in itself, as a *habitus* in the memory, and as something actually thought. This distinction is important because it explains that the angels, although having the same innate thought contents, need to talk, because the acts of thought, depending on the will, are singular and must be communicated.³⁸ As noted by Harms Goris, there is an evolution in Aquinas' thought and use of terms. In earlier texts, he does not use the word 'speech' (*locutio*) for the process of thinking, of turning to the species (level 1), reserving this term for the act of addressing of one individual of the species to another. But in the *Summa theologiae*, just like Bonaventure (and Augustine), Thomas uses the term *locutio* for both the *inner word* or *speech* and for the *outer word*. This second *locutio*, which Thomas considered in some way "exterior" inasmuch as it is voluntarily directed to someone,³⁹ is indeed "interior" if considered in distinction from exterior human vocal speech.⁴⁰

	ST Ia q.107 a.1	
	Intelligible species or form in the intellect	
0	- existing as <i>habitus</i> in the memory	

³⁸ THOMAS DE AQUINO, *De veritate* q.8 a.13, ed. DONDAINE, in *Opera omnia* 22.2, 261-62.66-114 : "Responsio. Dicendum, quod Angeli cogitationes cordium per se et directe intueri non possunt. Ad hoc enim quod mens aliquid actu cogitet, requiritur intentio voluntatis, qua mens convertatur actu ad speciem quam habet, ut patet per Augustinum in Lib. de Trin. Motus autem voluntatis alterius non potest Angelo notus esse naturali cognitione, quia Angelus naturaliter cognoscit per formas sibi inditas, quae sunt similitudines rerum in natura existentium; motus autem voluntatis non habet dependentiam nec connexionem ad aliquam causam naturalem, sed solum ad causam divinam, quae in voluntatem sola imprimere potest. Unde motus voluntatis et cordis cogitatio non potest cognosci in aliquibus similitudinibus rerum naturalium, sed solum in essentia divina, quae in voluntatem imprimit. Et sic Angeli non possunt cognoscere cogitationes cordium directe, nisi in verbo ei reveletur.... Ad secundum dicendum, quod ex una specie quam intellectus penes se habet, in diversas cogitationes prodit, sicut per speciem hominis varia de homine possumus cogitare. Unde etsi Angelus videat intellectum nostrum figurari secundum speciem hominis, non sequitur quod cogitationem cordis determinate cognoscat"; cf. IDEM, *Ibid.* q.9 a.4 ad 2, 289: "Ad secundum dicendum, quod conscientia alterius dicitur penetrari quantum ad habitus, et non quantum ad actuales cogitationes"; IDEM, *Ibid.* q.9 a.4 ad 11, 290.

³⁹ THOMAS DE AQUINO, *De veritate* q.9 a.4 ad 9, ed. DONDAINE, in *Opera omnia* 22.2, 290.252-56: "Ad nonum dicendum, quod quamvis in Angelis non sit locutio exterior, sicut in nobis, scilicet per signa sensibilia; est tamen alio modo, ut ipsa ordinatio cogitationis ad alterum exterior locutio in Angelis dicatur."

⁴⁰ THOMAS DE AQUINO, *Summa theologiae* Ia q.107 a.1 ad 2.

1	- as considered in act, or thought	interior word, interior speech (<i>interius verbum, locutio interior</i>) = talking to oneself
2/3	- as related to someone else	exterior speech (<i>exterior locutio</i>) = talking to the other

What happened to the distinction between level 2 and level 3? In the corresponding texts in the first chart, Thomas added to the *ordinatio ad alterum* of the species the requirement that it should be “associated” with an adequate *medium* for its transmission. In his commentary on 1 Cor. 13:1 he also says that the angel manifests his thought using something that he knows in a natural way, and using it as a sign of the unknown, speech being thus realized through some mode of signification (“per quemdam significationis modum”).⁴¹ Although this seems to imply a difference between thought and speech, Thomas clearly answers the common question of whether the *locutio angelica* requires a *medium* in a negative way: the angelic sign, he says, is not the means by which the concept becomes exteriorised, it is this very sign as it is meant to be addressed, whereas for man it is what is signified by the outside word:

Furthermore, in every speech there should be some medium, by which the intention of the speaker is transferred to the listener. But such a medium cannot be found with angels. Nor then can there be speech.... To this third argument we say... that there is no need for any intermediate sign (*medium*) in order for the speech of one to be transferred to another; but the fact that the intention is to manifest it to the other is alone sufficient for this.⁴²

⁴¹ THOMAS DE AQUINO, *In I Cor.* 13:1 c.13 lect.1 §763, ed. R. CAI, in *Super epistolas S. Pauli lectura* 1, Torino-Roma 1953, 380: “Fit autem huiusmodi manifestatio dum inferior Angelus superiori loquitur, non per illuminationem, sed per quemdam significationis modum. Est enim in quolibet Angelo aliquid quod naturaliter ab altero Angelo cognoscitur. Dum ergo id quod est naturaliter notum, *proponitur ut signum quod est ignotum*, manifestatur occultum. Et talis manifestatio dicitur locutio ad similitudinem hominum qui occulta cordium manifestant aliis per *voces sensibiles*, aut per quodcumque aliud corporale exterius apparens. Unde et ea, quae sunt in Angelis naturaliter nota, *inquantum assumuntur ad manifestationem occultorum, dicuntur signa vel nutus*. Potestas autem manifestandi conceptum suum hoc modo *metaphorice lingua nominatur*.” The Italian version of the *reportatio* on the same passages stresses even more the importance of using a sign: “....quando angelus vult manifestare conceptum sui cordis alteri angelo quod est sibi ignotum, accipit aliquid quod est in eo illi angelo naturaliter cognoscibile et utitur eo ut signo...,” quoted by GORIS, “The Angelic Doctor and Angelic Speech”, 92 n. 8.

⁴² THOMAS DE AQUINO, *In II Sent.* d.11 q.2 obj. 3 et ad 3, ed. MANDONNET, 286, 288: “Praeterea, in omne locutione oportet esse aliquod medium, per quod intentio loquentis ad audientem deferatur. Sed tale medium in angelis inveniri non potest. Ergo nec locutio....

The nature of the sign is discussed in a very detailed way in *De veritate*. If for men the sign is that *from which* (*ex quo*) they get knowledge, proceeding from the sensible known to what is not known, such a “discursive mode” of knowledge is not available for angels, and thus for them the sign is merely that *in which* (*in quo*) knowledge is produced:

The sign, properly speaking, can only be said to be that *from which* there is knowledge of something through discursive reasoning, and according to this there is not a sign in angels, since their knowledge is not discursive... for this reason even in us signs are sensible, since our knowledge, which is discursive, comes from the sensible. But we can, speaking in a general way, call a sign any notation *in which* something is known; accordingly, the intelligible form can be called a sign of the thing which is known through it, and thus angels do know things through signs, and one angel talks to another through a sign, that is, through the species, in the act of which his intellect is perfectly directed to another angel.⁴³

Whereas in some texts Thomas attributes to the inner word the two kinds of complexity that correspond to the two intellectual operations, definition and enunciation,⁴⁴ elsewhere he denies any discursivity or complexity to angelic speech.⁴⁵ Angels, *in* their word, see in a simultaneous

Ad tertium dicendum quod... *non exigitur aliquod medium per quod deferatur locutio unius ad alterum*; sed sufficit ad hoc *solus ordo intentionis unius ad manifestandum alteri*”; *De veritate* q.9 a.6 ad 4, ed. DONDAINE, in *Opera omnia* 22.2, 293.72-74: “...non oportet ponere aliquod medium per quod deferatur aliquid ab uno in alterum.”

⁴³ THOMAS DE AQUINO, *De veritate* q.9 a.4 ad 4, ed. DONDAINE, in *Opera omnia* 22.2, 289.203-18: “Signum proprie loquendo non potest dici nisi aliquid *ex quo* deveniatur in cognitionem alterius quasi discurrendo, et secundum hoc signum in angelis non est *cum eorum scientia non sit discursiva*... et propter hoc etiam in nobis signa sunt sensibilia quia nostra cognitio, quae discursiva est, a sensibilibus oritur. Sed communiter possumus signum dicere quodcumque notum *in quo* aliquid cognoscatur; et secundum hoc forma intelligibilis potest dici signum rei quae per ipsam cognoscitur, et sic angeli cognoscunt res per signa, et sic unus angelus per signum alii loquitur, scilicet per speciem in cuius actu intellectus eius perfecte fit in ordine ad alterum.”

⁴⁴ THOMAS DE AQUINO, *In Iohannis evangelium* 1:1 c.1 lect.1 25, ed. R. CAI, in *Super Evangelium S. Joannis lectura*, Torino 1952, 8: “Illud ergo proprie dicitur verbum interius, quod intelligens intelligendo format. Intellectus autem duo format, secundum duas eius operationes. Nam secundum operationem suam, quae dicitur indivisibilium intelligentia, format definitionem; secundum vero operationem suam, qua componit et dividit, format enunciationem, vel aliquid huiusmodi. *Et ideo, illud sic formatum et expressum per operationem intellectus, vel definientis vel enuntiantis, exteriori voce significatur.*”

⁴⁵ THOMAS DE AQUINO, *De veritate* q.9 a.4 ad 4, ed. DONDAINE (Editio Leonina 22.2), 203-18 and q.8 a.15 resp. The discursive character of speech, however, provides an element of comparison with the real procession of the Word, in *De veritate* q.4 a.2, but this comparison will not be further used; see GORIS, “The Angelic Doctor”, 97-98 (see n. 2).

way everything that can be known in it,⁴⁶ all the predicates that can be attributed to it, all the consequences that can be drawn from it.⁴⁷ This is why angelic signs are of a different nature from men's: they are not that *from which* an inference is made (from smoke, the existence of fire is deduced), but that *in which* knowledge is produced. If angels do talk using affirmative and negative propositions just as syllogisms, it is not because they form them but because they have an immediate knowledge of propositions and syllogisms, and for this reason there can be neither errors nor lies in their speech.⁴⁸ Although Aquinas is still seeking some kind of parallel between angelic and human communication, their differences become more and more striking. Whereas in the early texts Thomas talks about the necessity of accommodating thought in a convenient form for its transmission, this idea is progressively abandoned, and although, as in *De veritate*, the notion of sign is still used, it has been modified since it has lost its main feature, discursivity. In the *Summa theologiae*, Thomas will draw out in full the consequences of an idea he had already stated both in his commentary on the *Sentences* and in *De veritate*, that there is no need of a *medium* for one angel to transfer his thought to another. Accordingly he will then speak of *locutio* and no longer of signs and insist, precisely, on the "immediate" mode of their communication: "as soon as an angel wants to manifest his concept to another, the other immediately knows it."⁴⁹ As I have shown elsewhere, it is probably in view of this mature theory that Dante, moving a step further, denies that angels have *locutio*, although he accepts that they can communicate in an immediate way: for him there is properly *locutio* only for men, in whom communication is achieved through a "sensible and rational sign" (rationality implying discursivity), which is used as a "medium" to transfer one's thoughts to an-

⁴⁶ THOMAS DE AQUINO, *Summa theologiae* Ia q.58 a.3 resp.: "Sic igitur et inferiores intellectus, scilicet hominum, per quendam motum et discursum intellectualis operationis perfectionem in cognitione veritatis adipiscuntur; dum scilicet *ex uno cognito in aliud cognitum* procedunt. Si autem statim in ipsa cognitione principii noti, inspicerent quasi notas omnes conclusiones consequentes, in eis discursus locum non haberet. Et hoc est in angelis: quia statim *in illis* quae primo naturaliter cognoscunt, inspiciunt omnia quaecumque in eis cognosci possunt."

⁴⁷ THOMAS DE AQUINO, *Summa theologiae* Ia q.58 a.4 resp. et ad 1: "*Angelus* autem, intelligendo quidditatem alicuius rei, simul intelligit quidquid ei attribui potest vel removeri ab ea. Unde intelligendo quod quid est, intelligit *quidquid nos* intelligere possumus et componendo et dividendo, per unum suum simplicem intellectus."

⁴⁸ THOMAS DE AQUINO, *Summa theologiae* Ia q.58 a.4 ad 2 et q.59 a.5 resp. et ad 3.

⁴⁹ THOMAS DE AQUINO, *Summa theologiae* Ia q.107 ad 1: "Et ideo quam cito vult manifestare suum conceptum, statim alius cognoscit."

other being.⁵⁰

VII. Giles of Rome

Giles of Rome does not accept the usual criterion of *ordinatio ad alterum* for distinguishing *cogitare* from *loqui*. He claims that *loqui* requires a specific act that makes the object of the *cogitatio* knowable to others. Here we shall discuss only one of the different kinds of *locutiones* which Giles attributes to angels.⁵¹

Giles' criticism is closely dependent on Thomas himself. He starts with the idea that acts of will are private, and thus unknown to other angels ("ordo voluntatis unius angeli est ignotus alteri angelo... et ordo voluntatis nostrae naturaliter et per se loquendo ignotus est cuilibet angelo," *In II Sent.*, 481aC), and concludes that this *ordo voluntatis* cannot thus be the only feature of speech, because, if so, the receiver would not know when a word is addressed to him. The mere contents, simple or complex, are totally transparent to others, but as such they do not produce any knowledge.⁵² An angel must decide not only to think *in generali* of a bird or of a man but *in speciali* of such or such a bird or of Plato or Socrates. In the same way he must decide not only to think about man and white-

⁵⁰ Cf. ROSIER-CATACH, "Solo all'uomo" (see n. 2 above).

⁵¹ Cf. FAES DE MOTTONI, "Voci, 'alfabeto' et altri segni degli angeli" (see n. 2 above); SUAREZ-NANI, *Connaissance et langage des anges* (see n. 2 above).

⁵² AEGIDIUS ROMANUS, *De cognitione angelorum* q.11, ed. Venetiis 1503, f. 107rb; cf. IDEM, *In II Sent.* q.3 a.1 resol., ed. Venetiis 1581, vol. 1, 481: "Videntur enim angeli verba, que formamus in intellectu nostro, et videt angelus superior verba, que format in suo intellectu inferior. Sed propter hoc nescit, quid cogitet, nisi forte in generali, quia nescit ad quid utatur illis verbis formatis. Hoc enim dependet ex solo ordine voluntatis, qui alteri angelo est ignotus.... Dicemus ergo quod *sicut in nobis* sunt verba in mente, expressiones verborum per voces vel per signa aliqua nota et manifesta, *sic et in Angelis* sunt verba in mente, per aliqua signa nota fiunt expressiones illorum verborum.... Et rursus *sicut in nobis*, quod est in mente uno modo, exprimitur per signa multipliciter, *sic et in Angelis, differenter tamen*, quia signa, per quae exprimimus quod habemus in mente, sunt sensibilia. Sed in Angelis et verba mente et expressiones verborum, sive signa, intellectualia sunt.... *Sic et in Angelis*, licet per idem verbum possint multa cogitare, possunt formare in mente sua aliqua signa intellectualia exprimentia quid cogitent per huiusmodi verbum, et erunt unius verbi multa signa, et multae expressiones, quia tot signa intellectualia possunt formare in mente, et tot expressiones verborum respectu alicuius verbi, vel respectu alicuius speciei, quot possunt intelligere, vel possunt cogitare per illam, vel per illud verbum: ut quaelibet cogitatio habeat suum signum et suam expressionem." See the criticism of GUILIELMUS DE OCKHAM, *In II Sent.* q.16 ("De locutione angelorum"), ed. G. GÁL et R. WOOD, in *Opera theologica* 5, St. Bonaventure, NY 1981, 361-64.

ness, but to associate them in an affirmative or negative way (“man is white” or “man is not white”). The act of will that allows him to specify his thought is not open to others, and so can be manifested only if it takes a suitable form, which Giles calls the *expressio verbi*. The *expressio verbi* is adapted to the different types of receivers (man, another angel, himself, God). For Giles, then, not only the fact that thoughts are directed to others but also these very modes of expression of thought are the distinctive feature of speech:

He (i.e., Thomas) wished to hold that the angel, through ordering his species by his will towards another angel, would thereby talk to him, and from this that he would manifest what he was conceiving and thinking about it. *But it is clear that the way in which the will is directed in one angel is unknown to the other angel*, because it is only a matter of the direction of his will. *If, therefore, merely through the ordering of his will, an angel were to direct his intelligible species to another angel, since the directing of the will is unknown to the other angel, then from this nothing would be manifested to that angel, nor from this would he talk to him.*

For which reason it should be known that, as the above made clear, when an angel voluntarily turns his attention to a species, he produces in himself an act of thinking, and forms in himself a thought or act of thinking. And in the same way we shall also say that, when an angel voluntarily turns his attention to a formed thought of this sort, he forms in himself an expression of his thought, in such a way that this expression of his thought, or this expression of an intelligible word, is more particular than the intelligible word or than the thought itself. For this reason even if one angel cannot understand in another his thought or his intelligible word because of its universality, he can understand this expression because of its particularity. And we can understand this through the parallel with what happens with us....⁵³

⁵³ AEGIDIUS ROMANUS, *De cognitione angelorum* a.12, ed. Venetiis 1503, f. 111ra-b: “Vult enim quod angelus per suam voluntatem ordinando speciem suam ad alium angelum ex hoc loquatur ei, et ex hoc patefaciat suum conceptum et suam affectionem. *Sed constat quod ordo voluntatis in uno angelo est ignotus alteri angelo*, quia subiacet solum ordini voluntatis. *Angelus itaque si ex solo ordine voluntatis ordinaret speciem suam intelligibilem ad alium angelum, cum ordo voluntatis sit alii angelo ignotus, ex hoc non esset illi angelo aliquid patefactum, nec ex hoc loqueretur ei.* Propter quod sciendum quod ut est ex superioribus patefactum angelus per voluntatem convertendo se super aliquam speciem facit se in actum intelligendi et format in seipso intellectionem sive actum intelligendi, sic etiam dicemus quod angelus per voluntatem convertendo se super huiusmodi intellectionem formatam format in se intellectionis expressionem, ita quod ipsa expressio intellectionis vel ipsa expressio verbi intelligibilis erit particularior quam ipsum verbum intelligibile vel quam ipsa intellectio. Propter quod licet unus angelus non possit in alio intelligere suam intellectionem sive suum verbum intelligibile propter talium universalitatem, intel-

In angelic speech, just as in men's, there is a first operation, which is paying attention to the intelligible species, which produces an intelligible word; then a second operation, which produces an expression of this word, different from the intelligible word, in that it is more particular (in the case of simple contents) or specified as affirmative or negative (in the case of complex contents). Giles seems to think that affirmation and negation occur only at this level of the *expressio verbi*, since these logical operations do not have their own species ("affirmatio et negatio non habent distinctas species," *De cognitione*, f. 107a), that, therefore, for men, they do not exist in the mind:

In the mind there is no difference between affirmative and negative <utterances>, and there is no difference between what is the direct thought <of the intelligible species> and what is derived from it and thus even though an angel sees that the intellect <of the other> is turned towards the species in its direct form, he does not know, however, if the other angel is thinking of the species in its direct form or in a derivative form, and does not know if the other angel thinks in an affirmative or in a negative way. But although *this is so in the mind, it is not so when vocally expressed, because it is not by the same word that the direct <thought> and the derivative <one> is expressed, just as there is a vocal difference between an affirmative and a negative proposition.* And it is the same with angels. Even if through one and the same word they can think of various things, they can form in their minds some intellectual signs expressing what they think with this word, and from one word there will be many signs and many expressions, because *they can form as many intellectual signs in their minds and as many expressions of these words with respect to any word* (or with respect to any species) as they can understand or think through this species or through this word, so that *each act of thought has its own sign and expression.*⁵⁴

liget talem expressionem horum propter huius particularitatem. Declarabimus autem hoc in nobis ipsis per simile. Nam licet nos per eandem speciem et per eandem intellectionem sive per idem verbum intelligibile intelligamus rectum et obliquum, non enim utrumque horum proferimus per idem verbum vocale, nec est idem nomen utriusque, sed alio nomine nominatur rectum et alio obliquum, mediante enim specie intelligibili formatus in nobis actus intelligendi qui potest dici intellectio, et quia huius actus est perfectior quam actus sensus, ideo ex perfectione actus intelligibilis habet in nobis esse verbum intelligibile, quia verbum intelligibile intra formatum est illud quod exprimitur per verbum vocale extra formatum est unde et Augustinus ix *De trinitate* cap. ii ait quod verbum quod foris sonat signum est verbi quod intus lucet. Istud autem verbum exterius particularius est ut diximus quod verbum interius."

⁵⁴ AEGIDIUS ROMANUS, *De cognitione angelorum* a.12, ed. Venetiis 1503, ff. 481-482: "In mente quidem non differt oratio affirmativa a negativa, nec differt illud per quod intelligitur rectum et per quod obliquum, ideo quantumcunque Angelus videat, quod intellectus

One and the same intelligible word can be further thought of in various ways, and thus expressed through various expressions. Whereas Thomas said that there are as many *nutus* as there are conversions to others,⁵⁵ Giles claims that there are as many of these expressions or signs as there are acts of turning to this intelligible word:

The angel forms as many expressions of his intellection as he turns to his intelligible species, and as he refers to his thought. For the angel will neither form the same expression nor the same intelligible sign insofar as he turns to the species of a bird to the effect that it represents all the birds as a genus, or insofar it represents this or that species of a bird, and insofar it represents this individual bird or that individual bird; on the contrary, there will be as many intelligible signs and expressions of thought as there are these acts of turning. And from this follows that these expressions of thought or intelligible signs are overt to angels, but the thought and intelligible words themselves are hidden from them, because what a word or intellection contains in a united way, the expressions of words and intellections contain scattered and in a distinct and particular way. For instance if a superior angel sees in an inferior angel the species of a bird that has been formed in act, and he sees the thought generated from it, and the word generated from it, he knows well that he is thinking about birds, but he does not know whether he is thinking of them as a genus or as some species of a bird or as some particular in an individual way. But when the angel has formed in himself the expression of his thought, and expressed whether he is thinking of the bird as a genus, a species or an individual, so that, *just as he is thinking about it in various ways, so he is expressing it in various ways*, then through this expression what was previously hidden begins to be overt to the other angel.⁵⁶

se convertit /482A/ supra speciem recti, nescit tamen, utrum cogitet de recto, vel de obliquo, et nescit utrum cogitet affirmative vel negative. Sed licet *sic sit in mente, non est sic in voce, quia non eodem vocabulo exprimitur rectum et obliquum, et in voce differt propositio affirmativa et negativa*. Sic et in Angelis, licet per idem verbum possint multa cogitare, possunt formare in mente sua aliqua *signa intellectualia* exprimentia quid cogitent per huiusmodi verbum, et erunt unius verbi multa signa, et multae expressiones, quia *tot signa intellectualia possunt formare in mente, et tot expressiones verborum respectu alicuius verbi*, vel respectu alicuius speciei, quot possunt intelligere, vel possunt cogitare per illam, vel per illud verbum: ut *quaelibet cogitatio habeat suum signum et suam expressionem*.”

⁵⁵ THOMAS DE AQUINO, *De veritate* q.9 a.7 ad 2, ed. DONDAINE, in *Opera omnia* 22.2, 294.59-60: “sed in speciali sunt tot nutus, quot sunt conversiones ad diversos....”

⁵⁶ AEGIDIUS ROMANUS, *De cognitione angelorum* q.13, ed. Venetiis 1503, f. 113ra-rb: “Nam quot modis se convertit angelus super sua specie intelligibili et quot modis refert suam intellectionem, tot format illius intellectionis expressiones. Non enim eandem expressionem nec idem signum intelligibile formabit angelus prout convertit se super spe-

Giles details in a very precise way the different steps leading to the formation of an expressed word, for angels as for men:

		<i>In IV Sententiarum</i> , 482bA and 491bA	
		Homo	Angelus
0	Knowing	innate intelligible species	innate intelligible species
1	Thinking	intelligible word, fantasma, idolum	general intelligible word, intellectual concept, thought (<i>cogitatio</i>)
2	Forming a word (<i>intelligere, cogitare</i>)	intelligible internal word (<i>verbum intelligibile intra formatum</i>), imaginary word (<i>verbum imaginarium, verbum imaginabile</i>)	particular intelligible word, intelligible sign
3	Talking (<i>Loqui</i>)	formed word, exterior (<i>verbum formatum, particulare, verbum vocale extra formatum, sensitivum</i>) = <i>sensibile sign</i>	= expression of the word, <i>intellectual sign</i> formed in the mind and other types of signs (formed in the air, in imagination, etc.)

When one angel speaks to another one, angels' speech *is not the thought* (which happens when, turning to a species, he forms the word), nor *is it merely the ordering of the will* (which happens when solely with the will he directs the word to another angel), because the fact that the will is directed towards an angel is not known to the other angel, but this speech (*locutio*) is what happens when an angel turns to this word or to this thought, and forms in his mind an intelligible sign, which is the expression and the manifestation of this word and of this thought. What we can do through intellection, imagination and utter-

ciem volatilis ut representat omnia volatilia generaliter et ut representat hanc speciem volatilis specialiter et ut representat hoc particulare volatile singulariter, immo quot erunt ibi huiusmodi conversiones, tot erunt ibi signa intelligibilia et intellectionum expressiones. Et inde est quod huiusmodi expressiones intellectionum sive huiusmodi signa intelligibilia sunt angelis patentia, sed ipse intellectiones et ipsa verba intelligibilia sunt eos latentia, quia quod verbum sive intellectio continet unitive, expressiones verborum et intellectionum continent sparsim et distincte et particulariter: ut si videat angelus superior in angelo inferiori speciem volatilis esse factam in actu, et videat intellectionem inde generatam et verbum inde formatum, bene scit quod cogitat de volatilibus, sed nescit utrum cogitet de eis generaliter vel si de aliqua specie cogitat specialiter vel de aliquo particulari singulariter. Sed postquam angelus format in seipso sue intellectionis expressionem et exprimit ut cogitet de volatili generaliter vel specialiter vel singulariter, ita quod secundum quod vario modo cogitat, sic vario modo exprimit, tunc incipit alteri angelo per huiusmodi expressionem esse patens quod prius erat latens."

ance, the angel can do just as well and even better through his intellect alone. (1) Thus, just as in the mind after having formed a *word*, through understanding and thinking something in act, (2) we can in the imagination form a *sign*, and (3) in an utterance which we pronounce a sound, which is the expression and manifestation of this word formed in our mind, so in his own way the angel (1) after he has formed in his mind some *word*, through understanding and thinking something in act, (2) can in this very mind form an *intelligible sign*, (3) such that through it he thinks and understands the word, manifesting and expressing it to the other angel and thus speaking to him. *Such a formation of the intelligible sign and expression of his understanding and thought with this sign is angels' speech, when one angel speaks to another one*, because insofar as the angel speaks to himself or to God, there is no necessity for him to form an intelligible sign.⁵⁷

Giles' originality lies in his claim that there is a difference between the formation of the intelligible word, which is completely unspecified, and its expression, which is specified as a genus, a species or an individual in the case of simple contents, or as affirmative and negative in the case of complex contents. In the case considered, the production of the intelligible sign is voluntary. But the specification needed for real communication can also occur non-voluntarily, that is in a natural way. Giles often takes the same example of an angel trying to read a man's mind. In the same way as in inter-angelic communication, only the generic contents of the human thought are transparent to him, but to see them does not produce real knowledge. But involuntary bodily signs can make the thought specific: for instance, suppose the general thought is of flight, if the man

⁵⁷ AEGIDIUS ROMANUS, *In II Sent.* q.3 a.1 resol., ed. Venetiis 1581, vol. 1, 482bA: "Locutio itaque Angeli, prout unus angelus loquitur alteri, *non est ipsa cogitatio*, prout convertens se supra speciem format verbum, *nec est sola voluntatis ordinatio*, prout solum per voluntatem ordinat huiusmodi verbum ad alium, quia ordo voluntatis in uno angelo, non est notus alteri angelo, sed huiusmodi locutio est, *prout angelus convertit se super huiusmodi verbum, vel super huiusmodi suam cogitationem et format in mente sua aliquod signum intelligibile quod est expressio et manifestatio verbi sui, et cogitationis suae*. Quod enim nos possumus /B/ per intellectum, imaginationem, et vocem, potest hoc, et amplius Angelus per intellectum tantum. (1) Ideo sicut nos postquam in mente formavimus *verbum*, aliquid actu intelligendo, et cogitando, (2) possumus in imaginatione formare aliquod *signum*, (3) et in voce proferre aliquem *sonum*, quod est expressio, et manifestatio illius verbi in mente concepti; (1) sic Angelus suo modo, postquam in mente sua formavit aliquod *verbum*, aliquid actu intelligendo et cogitando, (2) potest in eadem mente formare aliquod *signum intelligibile*, (3) quod per illud verbum intelligit et cogitat, alteri Angelo manifestando et exprimendo, et sic ei loqui. *Talis ergo signi intelligibilis formatio, et per tale signum intelligibile suae intellectionis et suae cogitationis expressio, est Angelorum locutio, prout unus angelus loquitur alteri*, quia prout angelus loquitur sibi, vel prout loquitur Deo non oportet quod huiusmodi signa intelligibilia formet."

thinks of not fleeing, then he will warm up (sic!), and this will provide the angel with a natural sign indicating that he thinks of flight in a negative way, therefore of not fleeing, and conversely. These natural signs have the same role for the angel or the demon who wants to read in man's mind as a sign which he produces voluntarily; without such signs his thought would be opaque.⁵⁸ In fact Giles here follows Thomas, who, when wondering whether an angel can know "the thoughts of the heart" (*cogitationes cordium*), also mentions the "movements of the face," which betray and thus manifest inward thoughts. But the originality of Giles is that he integrates these manifestations into the typology derived from Augustine, making them a *fourth* type of word, the "word of passion", which he adds to the intellectual, imagined and sensible word. All of these words are *locutiones*, "since one can talk with the intellect, with the imagination, with the senses, and, taking "talking" in a wide sense, for any manifestation of our concepts, we can add a fourth mode, since we can talk with the passions...."⁵⁹

Giles distinguishes four types of signs, which can be used according to the various receivers, that is, when the angel talks to God, himself, an angel, a man, and he then clarifies whether these types are intelligible or sensible, known to everyone or hidden, voluntary or natural, etc. When an angel wants to talk to a man, he can use corporeal signs, either producing sounds (through the air, which he can break and reflect), or producing images of sounds in the man's imagination, which the man will then be able to utter, or even producing images of the thing he wants to talk about. He can also use this last type to speak to another angel: he produces images (of sounds or of things) in the imagination of a man, which another angel will be able to read. There is still another kind of sign, which can be used only in inter-angelic communication: the angel applies his power to the sky, thus producing "celestial figures" similar to the ones produced on parchment by application of ink with a quill. The sky, says Giles, is thus

⁵⁸ AEGIDIUS ROMANUS, *De cognitione linguarum* q.11, f. 107va-vb.

⁵⁹ AEGIDIUS ROMANUS, *De cognitione linguarum* q.13, f. 113va: "Vult quod non solum loquamur exterius ore per verba sensibilia, sed loquamur interius in corde sive in intellectu per verba intelligibilia et sicut formatio verbi intelligibilis dicitur locutio, et formatio verbi sensibilis locutio vocatur, sic et formatio verbi imaginabilis locutio dici potest, loquitur ergo intellectualiter, imaginabiliter et sensibiliter. Sed accipiendo *locutionem* large pro *quacumque manifestatione conceptuum nostrorum*, possumus addere et quartum locutionis modum ut dicamus quod loquimur passionally ut per passiones aggregatas in nobis, nam per passiones in nobis factas angeli et demones multa possunt videre de conceptionibus nostris."

like a parchment provided by God, so that the sky is the book of the universe.... All of these original developments show how important the notion of “sign” is for Giles of Rome, and how far we are here from the assimilation of the sign to the concept which we read in earlier thinkers. The sign has a reality as a medium to transmit thoughts, and is not merely the thought as addressed to the receiver. Even if this complex typology is mentioned in Jean Quidort, the following discussions, in Duns Scotus and Ockham for instance, will mostly concentrate on Giles’ criticism of Thomas, and on his notion of *expressio verbi* as distinct from the *verbum intelligibile* itself.

Conclusion

The theory of the threefold word (*verbum*) found in Augustine, Anselm and John of Damascus is not easily applicable to the question of angels’ speech. The thirteenth-century theologians accept the distinction between a level (0) where the species are present in the memory, and a level (1) where there is a voluntary turning to these species to form an intelligible word. But difficulties then arise because it is not possible to assign a difference between the *verbum nullius linguae* of level 1, and the *verbum imaginabile vocis* of level 2, this latter being related to a particular tongue in human speech. Furthermore there is no difference, for angels, between interiority and exteriority, and this destroys the distinction between level 2 and level 3. Again, the communicative dimension, which is only found in Augustine at level 3 with the *verbum prolatum*, must be set apart from the feature of being “pronounced” (*prolatum*), since—except in some of the signs devised by Giles of Rome—there is no articulation in angelic speech. We have seen the various strategies adopted by theologians to establish a distinction between *cogitatio* and *locutio*, which seems to be a major commitment.

So how do theologians consider this third level, the one which corresponds in men to the *verbum prolatum*? For the author of the *Summa Halensis*, it is only at this third level that there is properly *locutio*, with signs or *nutus*. For Albert the Great, it corresponds to the relation set between the species and the object (*innuitio ad rem*), which characterises the *nutus*. For Bonaventure, there is something added to the *cogitatio*, which can be a sensible sign for men, or the relation to others for angels. In all of these analyses the difference between the three types of word is a difference of *ratio*, and the theologians clearly state that the word *is* the sign as addressed to others, although in some early texts Thomas adds that this

sign must be put in an adequate form in order to be received. By contrast, Giles of Rome wants to maintain a real difference between the intelligible word, which is confused and generic, and the “formed word” (*verbum formatum*), which is more determinate. We find the same kind of conception in Henry of Ghent, who distinguishes between the intelligible word which corresponds to a “vague particular” (*particulare vagum*), and the uttered word which corresponds to a “designated particular” (*particulare signatum*). For him, each angel has the same knowledge of universals, but for particulars it depends on a revelation, which reveals the particular mode of existence of the universal. And it is this revelation that renders talking necessary, since it must be transmitted to others. Interestingly, Peter of John Olivi seems to accept both ways, a communication depending on the mere will and one that requires natural or voluntary signs, producing similitudes in the mind.⁶⁰

The Augustinian theory of the word, as set out in the *De Trinitate*, follows two models, visual and verbal,⁶¹ the properties and aims of which are distinct. But these two are not easily recognizable in discussions on angelic communication, because their purpose is different: it is to describe a process of communication, of talking, or, in other words, of opening of the self so that it can be read by the other. In its ordinary usage, the word *nutus* refers to the model of vision. In this visual model, Augustine thinks of the noetic process as it unfolds, insisting on the formal similarity between the different states of the word, i.e., a similarity between the real object, the object as seen and the object as thought. But in our texts, a verbal model is put forward, since their purpose is to explain the communicative process, the exteriorisation of a thought so that it reaches another being. In the verbal model that Augustine offers, it is the radical heterogeneity of the *verbum* and the *vehiculum verbi* which is then stressed. Since, however, there is no real “exteriorisation” for angels, Augustine’s differentiation of nature between the interior and the exterior word cannot be upheld. If, ultimately, it is the vocabulary of vision that is preserved in these texts, it is because for angels “talking” is producing a sign so that one angel can *see* it in another. And it may be because the term *signum* is often associated with a vocal sign that the term *nutus* is used, with a new and untranslatable meaning, for this sign which is addressed to spiritual

⁶⁰ See ROSIER-CATACH, “Le parler des anges” (see n. 2 above).

⁶¹ I. KOCH, “Le *verbum in corde* chez Augustin”, in *Le langage mental du Moyen Âge à l’Âge Classique*, éd. par J. BIARD, Louvain 2009, 1-28; M. SIRRIDGE, “*Quam videndo intus dicimus*: Seeing and Saying in *De trinitate* XV”, in *Medieval Analyses in Language and Cognition*, ed. S. EBBESEN and R. FRIEDMAN, Copenhagen 1999, 317-30.

vision.

As Claude Panaccio has said, it is true that the discussions on angelic communication do not seem a major issue in thirteenth-century theological debates, and this certainly explains why theologians do not always try to harmonize what they say about *verbum* in general and as related to angels' speech. But it seems, for this very reason, that these discussions are interesting for understanding the theologians' views on language. They constitute an important context for the later debates on mental language, on the identity or difference between thought and language, and on the concept as an act and as a sign. Theologians are required to think in a unified way about the notions of *verbum*, *signum* and *locutio*, to devise a system that takes into account both the representative and the communicative function of the sign, and this corresponds to two series of works by Augustine, to the books of *De Trinitate*, on the one hand, and to *De doctrina christiana*, *De magistro* and his books concerning lies, on the other. In *De Trinitate*, Augustine focuses on the process that goes from the species to the exterior word, and thus involves a complex psychology that can be compared with the Aristotelian model of *De anima*. In the second series he focuses on the inter-subjective relationship between speaker and hearer. In these chapters, we do not find analogies between the Trinity and the three states of the *verbum*, but rather, because of the nature of the question asked, we encounter noetic, semiotic or linguistic considerations.

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